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The capability of adult and child witnesses to accurately recollect events from the past and provide
reliable testimony has been hotly debated for more than 100 years. Prominent legal cases of the 1980s
and 1990s sparked lengthy debates and important research questions surrounding the fallibility and
general reliability of memory. But what lessons have we learned, some 35 years later, about the role of
memory in the judicial system? In this review, we focus on what we now know about the consequences of
the fallibility of memory for legal proceedings. We present a brief historical overview of false memories
that focuses on three critical forensic areas that changed memory research: children as eyewitnesses,
historic sexual abuse and eyewitness (mis)identification. We revisit some of the prominent trials of the
1980s and 1990s to not only consider the role false memories have played in judicial decisions, but also to
see how this has helped us understand memory today. Finally, we consider the way in which the research
on memory (true and false) has been successfully integrated into some courtroom procedures.
Keywords: False memories; Childhood memories; Memory evidence; Eyewitness identification; Forensic
interviewing; Expert witnesses.
The science of memory is as central to the law as
biology is to medicine. (Brainerd, 2013, p. 547)
When memory serves as evidence, as it does in
many civil and criminal legal proceedings, there
are a number of important limitations to the
veracity of that evidence. This is because memory
does not provide a veridical representation of
events as experienced. Rather, what gets encoded
into memory is determined by what a person
attends to, what they already have stored in
memory, their expectations, needs and emotional
state. This information is subsequently integrated
(consolidated) with other information that has
already been stored in a person’s long-term,
autobiographical memory. What gets retrieved
later from that memory is determined by that
same multitude of factors that contributed to
encoding as well as what drives the recollection
of the event. Specifically, what gets retold about
an experience depends on whom one is talking to
and what the purpose is of remembering that
particular event (e.g., telling a friend, relaying an
experience to a therapist, telling the police about
an event). Moreover, what gets remembered is
reconstructed from the remnants of what was
originally stored; that is, what we remember is
constructed from whatever remains in memory
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following any forgetting or interference from new
experiences that may have occurred across the
interval between storing and retrieving a particu-
lar experience. Because the contents of our
memories for experiences involve the active
manipulation (during encoding), integration with
pre-existing information (during consolidation),
and reconstruction (during retrieval) of that
information, memory is, by definition, fallible at
best and unreliable at worst.
This fallibility of memory includes not only the
omission of details from the original experience,
but extends to errors of commission including the
creation of memory illusions. Memory illusions
can be as simple as misremembering whether one
saw a Stop sign or a Yield sign at an intersection
to misremembering entire experiences such as
being lost in a shopping mall as a child or even
being abducted by a UFO. Such illusions can
emerge spontaneously in an individual, being
created endogenously, or can arise due to the
suggestion of another person, being created
exogenously. Although the source or origin of
these memory illusions might differ, because their
memorial consequences are essentially the same,
we will use the term false memory to refer to both
types of memory illusion.
This view of memory has emerged over the
past few decades of intense scientific research
about memory processes, much of which was
inspired by memory researchers interacting with
the judicial system. That is, when memory
researchers serve as memory experts in the court-
room, new translational questions emerge about
the nature of memory particularly as it pertains to
memory accuracy for traumatic events. As well,
questions arise as to how well people involved in
forensic settings understand how memory works.
Numerous studies have shown that police, judges,
jurors and others involved in the legal system
have a number of naïve beliefs about memories,
ones that contradict scientific research (e.g.,
Benton, Ross, Bradshaw, Thomas, & Bradshaw,
2006; Magnussen, Melinder, Raja, & Stridbeck,
2010; Rubin & Bernstein, 2007). For example,
there is the belief that the more specific details a
complainant can remember (e.g., verbatim con-
versations, the clothing people were wearing, the
day of the week the event happened, what they
ate for breakfast that day) the more accurate the
memory (see Bell & Loftus, 1988). Of course,
what the scientific study of memory shows is that
quite often rather than being seen as a sign of the
veracity of that memory such details are a
harbinger for scepticism (e.g., Howe, 2013a,
2013b).
This disconnect between the science of mem-
ory and the beliefs held by those involved in
judicial processes can lead to fundamental mis-
carriages of justice, many of which can be found
on the Innocence Project websites in the USA
(http://www.innocenceproject.org/) and the UK
(http://www.innocencenetwork.org.uk/). In many
of these cases, convictions were obtained on the
basis of memory evidence (e.g., faulty eyewitness
identifications). Of course, in many legal cases,
decisions to lay charges in the first place often
hinges on memory evidence educed from police
interviews and subsequent convictions can also
hinge on this interview evidence. When such
evidence is viewed through the veil of naive
beliefs about memory, and memory experts are
not in place to provide testimony about how
memory actually works, then police and triers of
fact are making decisions about the weight of
memory evidence without actually understanding
how memory works.
Of course, the science of memory is an ongoing
project, but our current understanding of recol-
lective experiences is that they are fragmentary,
contain amnesic gaps, information is often out of
order, contain guesses and often contain incorrect
details. Sometimes the incorrect nature of these
details are known to the rememberer although
oftentimes they are not, having been produced
and inserted into the narrative in an automatic
fashion, outside of conscious awareness (Conway,
Howe, & Knott, in press; Howe, 2013a). Research
from the past 40 years has taught us what we
understand about these fundamental attributes of
false memory and suggestibility.
Importantly, research on memory (true and
false) is now being successfully integrated into
some courtroom procedures and today we see
signs that the law is beginning to keep pace with
science. Many of these advances, both in our
understanding of memory and its successful integ-
ration into some forensic settings, are the result of
some landmark decisions that emerged in cases
from the 1980s and 1990s. The focus of this
review is to consider the consequences of false
memories in legal proceedings, examining the
nature of false memory with a look at lessons
from these cases and their modern day conse-
quences. In this review, we consider memory and
suggestibility in three forensic contexts including
children as eyewitnesses, historic sexual abuse
(HSA) and eyewitness (mis)identification.
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CHILDREN AS EYEWITNESSES
The degree to which heightened levels of sug-
gestibility may affect children’s ability to accur-
ately report what they have witnessed has been
the focus of scholarly attention since the turn of
the twentieth century. However, these issues
became particularly important, at least in the
USA, during the 1980s and 1990s as the number
of children involved in legal proceedings for
sexual abuse increased dramatically (see Ceci &
Bruck, 1993, 1995). This was the result of a large
shift in society’s recognition of, and sensitivity to,
problems of abuse suffered by children. This led
to important changes in legal proceedings not
only in the USA, but in several countries across
the Western world that allowed children to
provide uncorroborated testimony in cases of
violence and abuse. In fact, summaries of statist-
ics from the National Center on Child Abuse and
Neglect in America (Poole & Lamb, 1998)
showed that the number of investigations of child
sexual abuse quadrupled from the late 1970s to
the 1990s. Indeed, Ceci and Bruck (1993) esti-
mated that in the early 1990s over 13,000 children
testified each year in sexual abuse cases.
With such allegations often there is little
forensic evidence. Sexual victimisation of children
typically occurs in private and usually involves
only two people, the victim and the perpetrator.
Of course, depending on the nature of the sexual
abuse, there may be physical signs that abuse has
occurred. However, more often, such signs are
not present (McGough, 1993). As Brainerd and
Reyna (2005, p. 294) pointed out:
Even acts of sexual abuse that involve penetra-
tion of the vagina or rectum may fail to leave any
reliable evidence. Vaginal and rectal tissue may
heal and may not be noticeably damaged by
penetration. Moreover, when tissue damage is
present, this is not in itself reliable evidence of
sexual penetration because these injuries can
occur in other ways. As a rule, damage to vaginal
or rectal tissue is only a reliable indicator of
sexual penetration when it is accompanied by
bodily fluids, tissue, or hair from the perpetrator.
Because of the frequent absence of physical
evidence, forensic investigators rely on children’s
memory reports from (police, social worker)
interviews as evidence in such cases. Although
researchers in this field uphold the statement that
most cases that end up in the legal system involve
true claims of sexual abuse, a number of sensa-
tionalised “day care abuse” cases from the 1980s
and 1990s led to fundamental concerns regarding
the reliability of children’s testimony and the
interview techniques and strategies used to elicit
information from children in forensic situations.
As we will see below, fantastical claims of ritual-
istic abuse, pornography, cults and long-term
abuse of multiple victims were reported in
instances where little medical evidence could be
found, and where no adult eyewitnesses could
corroborate. Nevertheless, such claims were
believed by health professionals, police, prosecu-
tors, and the family and friends of those involved.
At the time, the prosecutors made the argument
that the children would not lie about sexual
abuse, whereas the defense argued that the claims
and reports made about the abuse were a result
of repeated suggestive interviewing by not only
the police, but the children’s parents, social
workers and therapists who were in contact with
the children. Although we now have scientific
evidence to support this claim, at the time there
was little direct evidence to suggest this could be
the case. As Ceci and Bruck (1995) stated,
because of this lack of evidence and common
belief that the children would not be able to
invent stories of sexual abuse, many of these
cases ended in convictions.
Today we know, of course, that eliciting such
evidence from children can be controversial and
that the reliability of this memory evidence
depends not only on the style of questioning but
also on the types of questions children are asked.
Because of these concerns, memory development
researchers took a special interest in the inter-
viewing techniques used to elicit children’s mem-
ory reports and, ultimately, how children’s
reports can be moulded by suggestions implanted
by adult interviewers (for a review, see Ceci &
Bruck, 1995). Experimental exploration of these
techniques has led to important insights regarding
child suggestibility and forensic interview techni-
ques for children (Ceci & Bruck, 1993, 1995;
Poole & Lamb, 1998). The culmination of this
research resulted in a considerable revision of
what constituted appropriate questioning of child
witnesses (Ceci & Friedman, 2000). Today, the
preferred interviewing strategy with children is
the one developed by the National Institute of
Child Health and Human Development (NICHD;
see Lamb, Orbach, Hershkowitz, Esplin, & Hor-
owitz, 2007). Here, there is not just a specific
structure to the timing and sequence of how a
child should be interviewed, but also recommen-
dations for what not to do.
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To understand how we came to this protocol
for questioning children, we look back at two of
the key legal cases that highlight just how
susceptible children can be to suggestive pressure
during interviews. We then discuss the ensuing
research that has documented the suggestive and
coercive procedures that we now know can
substantially increase the risk of children’s sus-
ceptibility to making false allegations.
The McMartin Preschool case
The McMartin Preschool case was the first case of
its kind to receive national media attention in the
USA (for a detailed history see Butler, Fukurai,
Dimitrius, & Krooth, 2001). In 1983, seven
teachers, including the owner of the preschool,
Peggy McMartin Buckey, and her son were
accused of child abuse and satanic ritual abuse
involving several hundred children over a 10-year
period. Among the more bizarre allegations, the
teachers were accused of kidnapping children and
flying them to an isolated farm where the children
saw animals tortured and were forced to engage
in group sex. The main and only supporting
evidence came from the investigative interviews
of the children, conducted by a Los Angeles
social service agency under contract to the prose-
cutor’s office (Wilkerson & Rainey, 1990). The
investigation began in 1983 and ended in the
early 1990s. It became one of the longest and
most expensive trials in California history. All
charges were eventually dropped against the five
teachers without going to trial. Peggy Buckey and
her son Raymond were tried but later acquitted
and all charges were dropped.
The Wee Care Nursery case
In 1988, Kelly Michaels (State v. Michaels) was
accused of sexually abusing 20 preschool children
at the Wee Care Nursery in Maplewood, New
Jersey. It began when a former 4-year-old pupil
of Michaels had his temperature taken at the
paediatrician’s office and remarked “That’s what
my teacher does to me at school” (Manshel, 1990,
p. 126). The paediatrician advised the mother to
inform the state’s child protective agency who
interviewed the child two days later. During the
interview, the child inserted his finger into the
rectum of an anatomical doll. Two other boys
were reported by the child to have the same thing
happen to them. When questioned, the boys
denied this had happened, but one boy did say
Michaels touched his penis. Following these ini-
tial allegations, the Wee Care Nursery School
sent out a letter to parents informing them of an
investigation regarding serious allegations. A
meeting with a social worker followed this, where
the parents were told of the common occurrence
of child sex abuse in children. She urged the
parents to examine the children for any signs of
abuse, including genital soreness, nightmares,
bed-wetting and notable changes in behaviour.
Soon many more allegations arose (Ceci &
Bruck, 1993).
Michaels was accused of raping and abusing
these children over a seven-month period during
school time. Among the many allegations against
Michaels, she was accused of licking peanut
butter off children’s genitals, playing the piano
in the nude and raping them with knives, forks,
spoons and Lego blocks (Ceci & Bruck, 1993).
None of these alleged acts were ever noticed by
other members of staff at the school and none of
the parents noticed any physical signs. A jury in
the Superior Court of New Jersey convicted
Michaels of 115 counts of aggravated assault,
sexual assault, endangering the welfare of chil-
dren and terroristic threats. In 1993, the Appel-
late Division reversed the convictions based, in
part, on an amicus brief (a written brief by a
“friend” of the court, someone who is not a party
to the case but who offers information bearing on
the case such as a legal opinion or an expert or
learned treatise) by a committee of concerned
scientists that questioned the reliability of the
interviewing techniques used with the 20 child
complainants. The court held that, “courts must
provide a remedy where the record demonstrates
that an accuser’s testimony is founded upon
unreliable perceptions, or memory caused by
improper investigative procedures if it results in
a defendant’s right to a fair trial being irretriev-
ably lost” [see State v. Michaels, 264 N.J.Super.
579, 631-32, 625 A.2d 489 (App. Div.1993)]. The
Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the
reversal of the judgement of Conviction [see State
v. Michaels, 136 N.J. 299, 642 A.2d 1372 (1994)],
and on 1 December 1994, the Essex County
Prosecutor’s Office dismissed all charges against
Michaels.
The McMartin and Wee Care Nursery cases
are the most widely documented in the scientific
community surrounding child eyewitness testi-
mony. The repeated interviewing, the suggestive
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and coercive nature of the questioning and the
length of the interrogations are among the factors
in these cases that ultimately led to many false
allegations. Indeed, the transcripts of interviews
from these cases highlight how the dynamics of a
conversation or interview can be so powerful as
to lead children to produce graphic and believ-
able statements of events that never happened to
them. In the amicus brief submitted to the
Supreme Court of New Jersey, Bruck and Ceci
(1995) demonstrated that these problems were
rife in children’s interviews and were related to
children’s suggestibility. Further, they cited spe-
cific instances in the interviews from the Michaels
case where interviewing techniques were consid-
ered to be so faulty that they will have substan-
tially influenced the reliability of children’s
testimonies leading to reports that were seen as
mere reflections of the interviewers’ suggestions.
Although a complete assessment of these tran-
scripts can be found in a reprinted version of the
amicus brief (Bruck & Ceci, 1995), we will briefly
highlight some key examples that demonstrate
those factors that influence children’s susceptibil-
ity to suggestion from the interview transcripts of
both the Kelly Michaels and McMartin cases
(Schreiber et al., 2006).
To begin, we have seen from previous studies
important evidence that interviewers’ beliefs
about an event can influence their style of
questioning and, in turn, the accuracy of a child’s
testimony. For example, White, Leichtman, and
Ceci (1997) provided interviewers with reports of
a scripted event that had been acted out with
preschool children. The event involved physical
touching, carrying out unusual actions and acting
or observing another child’s actions. Unknown to
the interviewers, some of the events described in
the report were incorrect. All children were
interviewed twice, once after a month and again
after two months had elapsed. The interviewer
was asked to conduct an interview to elicit the
most factually accurate report from the children.
Results showed that the interviewer’s questioning
was biased to the details provided in the report of
the event. Furthermore, younger children agreed
more often than older children to questions based
on incorrect information. Children agreed more
readily to unusual (e.g., children had put marbles
in the researchers ear) incorrect events, and
younger children’s reports became more inaccur-
ate with misleading information over time. Many
would also make inaccurate elaborations even
after they had originally correctly rejected queries
about events that did not happen. For example,
when asked, “Did you kiss the researcher?” a
child might rightly answer “No” but then com-
ment “but the researcher kissed me.”
The effect of interviewer bias and the failure to
test alternate explanations for children’s behavi-
our and answers can be seen in the interviews
from children in the Michaels case (Bruck & Ceci,
1995). There are many instances where the
interviewer persisted with a particular line of
inquiry (using repeated leading questions, bribes
and threats) even after the child denies the event
occurred, or after the child provides a bizarre or
inconsistent statement that should be followed
up. Because the interviewers held preconceived
biases, and believed that the major objective was
to get children to admit that they had been
sexually abused, the interviewers did not consider
that such statements might show that the children
were confused. Moreover, the interviewers made
no attempt to make sense of what the children
were saying; that is, whether the children were
just pretending, telling a joke or repeating some-
thing that had been said to them previously. We
see evidence of such a bizarre dialogue below in
an interview with one of the Michaels children:
Interviewer: Do you think that Kelly was not
good when she was hurting you all?
Child: Wasn’t hurting me. I like her
Interviewer: I can’t hear you, you got to look at
me when you talk to me. Now when Kelly was
bothering kids in the music room
Child: I got socks off
------------------------------------------------------------------
Interviewer: Did she make anybody else take
their clothes off in the music room?
Child: No
Interviewer: Yes
Child: No
------------------------------------------------------------------
(Michaels Interview, Bruck & Ceci, 1995, p. 276)
A range of suggestive techniques has been iden-
tified in the transcripts from the McMartin and
Michaels cases. This category can cover a large
range of suggestive influences. Schreiber et al.
(2006) highlight five kinds of techniques: (1)
reinforcement, (2) repetition of questions, (3)
co-witness information (peer pressure from other
children), (4) inviting speculation and (5) intro-
ducing new information. Reinforcement can take a
positive or negative form. Positive reinforcement
involves praising the child for something they
have said or something they could say that will
please the interviewer:
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Interviewer: So I bet if you guys put on your
thinking caps, you can help remember it. Now
let’s make a test of your brain and see how good
your memories are.
(McMartin Interview No. 107, pp. 32–33, 38)
A negative reinforcement or consequence occurs
when a child’s answer is criticised or disagreed
with. This indicates to the child that the statement
is inadequate and dubious. Repetition of questions
can also be considered as a form of negative
feedback, as the child sees that the previous
answer given was unacceptable. This is usually
associated with choice questions and research has
shown a reduction in accuracy of children’s
reports using repetition (Poole & White, 1991,
1995). The McMartin and Michaels interviewers
frequently used repeated questions when a child
denied abuse or when the child’s answer was
inconsistent with what the interviewers believed.
In many exchanges, the children would at first
consistently reject the suggestive questions, but
with repetition, the child would change their
answers:
Interviewer: When Kelly kissed you, did she ever
put her tongue in your mouth?
Child: No
Interviewer: Did she ever make you put your
tongue in her mouth?
Child: No
Interviewer: Did you ever have to kiss her
vagina?
Child: No
Interviewer: Which of the kids had to kiss her
vagina?
Child: What’s this?
Interviewer: No that’s my toy, my radio box.
Which kids had to kiss her vagina?
Child: Me
(Michaels Interview, Bruck & Ceci, 1995, p. 280)
We know from previous research that reinforce-
ment (both positive and negative) can have a
profound effect on children’s behaviour and has
considerable influence when used in child inter-
views. In a controlled laboratory-based study,
Garven, Wood, and Malpass (2000) provided
evidence for this effect. Here, children (5- to 7-
year-olds) were visited in their classroom by a
young man known as Paco Perez. A week later
the children were interviewed about the visit
using leading questions that were either mundane
(“Did Paco break a toy while he was visiting?”) or
fantastic (“Did Paco take you somewhere in a
helicopter?”). Half of the children were further
reinforced with praise for answers that included
false allegations regarding Paco and mild negative
feedback for answers that did not implicate Paco.
Reinforced children (35%) made more false
accusations against Paco than non-reinforced
children (12%). Interestingly, for fantastic ques-
tions, the false accusation rate was 52% for
reinforced children versus 5% for non-reinforced
children. Furthermore, when interviewed a week
later without reinforcement or leading questions,
the children reinforced at the previous interview
continued to make accusations at about the same
rate as previously.
Research has shown that co-witness informa-
tion is a form of “social proof” that leads to
conformity pressure to go along with other child
witnesses (Leichtman & Ceci, 1995) and can be
seen throughout the transcripts from the day care
cases:
Interviewer: You see all the kids in this picture?
Every single kid in this picture has come here
and talked to us. Isn’t that amazing? … These
kids came to visit us and we found out they know
a lot of yucky old secrets from that old school.
And they all came and told us the secrets. And
they’re helping us figure out this whole puzzle of
what used to go on in that place.
(McMartin Interview No. 107, pp. 16–17)
Interviewer: All the other friends I talked to told
me everything that happened. 29C told me. 32C
told me … And now it’s your turn to tell. You
don’t want to be left out, do you?
(Michaels Interview, Bruck & Ceci, 1995, p. 283)
Parents had also told their children that other
children had named them as victims. Bruck and
Ceci refer to Child 1C who finally disclosed his
“abuse” to his mother but only after she had told
him that others had mentioned him as a
participant.
In a similar vein, the Michaels and McMartin
children were continually asked to speculate
whether a particular event could have happened
or indeed asked to pretend that an event had
happened. Research has shown that such techni-
ques lead to errors in children’s recollections due
to failures of source monitoring. Inviting specula-
tion may have profound effects on the accuracy of
later recall because it is a form of self-generated
misinformation. Research shows that when chil-
dren are asked to “picture in their head” a
particular event, false assent not only occurs, but
increases across multiple sessions and continues
even when the children are informed that the
interviewer asked them to imagine events that did
not really happen (e.g., Ceci, Loftus, Leichtman,
& Bruck, 1994). Evidence of inviting speculation
occurred frequently in the day care interviews,
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with children often been asked to imagine how
certain instruments could be used to abuse the
children, and asking the children to show on
anatomical dolls where their teacher may have
touched them and other children in their class:
Interviewer: Why don’t you show me how you
think a little girl can be hurt by the fork?
(Michaels Interview, Bruck & Ceci, 1995, p. 292)
Although with age, children become less suscept-
ible to misinformation, introducing new informa-
tion can increase false allegations at all ages.
Schreiber et al. (2006) conducted a quantitative
analysis of instances of new information in the
McMartin and Michaels cases as well as a set of
Child Protective Services (CPS) interviews. These
were 100 sexual abuse interviews from the CPS
and considered as “normal” interviews that cre-
ated a comparison group. An interviewer ques-
tion or statement only received a rating for
introducing information if it (1) introduced new
material that was sexual, violent or negative in
content, (2) was contradictory or substantially
inconsistent with the child’s previous statements
or (3) referred to unusual and highly specific
events or ideas (e.g., being flown away from
school in a helicopter) not previously mentioned
by the child. For example:
Interviewer: How about Naked Movie Star? You
guys remember that game?
Child: No.
Interviewer: Everybody remembered that game.
Let’s see if we can figure it out.
(McMartin Interview 107, p. 32)
While just under 20% of the statements and
questions from the McMartin and Michaels inter-
views involved new information, only 3% of
statements in the CPS interviews contained new
information or information not consistent with
the child’s statements.
Although considerable research in the misin-
formation field has examined the effect of single
instances of implanted misinformation, if children
are repeatedly given misinformation in a series of
interviews, it can have serious consequences on
the accuracy of their later reports (Andrews &
Lamb, 2014; Bruck & Ceci, 1995). Misinformation
not only becomes incorporated into children’s
subsequent reports but also tends to increase
fabrication rates that do not always directly
mirror the content of the misleading information.
For example, Bruck, Ceci, Francoeur, and Renick
(1995) interviewed children about an event that
happened approximately 1 year earlier. Children
visited a paediatrician’s office where a male
paediatrician gave each child a physical examina-
tion, an oral polio vaccine and an inoculation.
During this visit, a female research assistant also
talked to the child about a poster, read them a
story and gave them some treats. They were re-
interviewed four times over a one-month period.
Some of the children were asked misleading
questions that suggested the roles were reversed
and that the research assistant completed the
examination and gave them the inoculation and
vaccine. Other children acted as controls and
received no misleading questions regarding the
research assistant and paediatrician. In the final
interview, children were asked to freely recall
what happened during the visit to the paediatri-
cian. Children in the control group provided
highly accurate information, whereas more than
half of the children in the misled group reported
that the female research assistant gave them the
physical examination. Interestingly, of these chil-
dren, 45% also included non-suggested but inac-
curate details (e.g., reported that the assistant had
checked their ears and nose). Although there is
no clear figure of the number of times children in
the day care cases were exposed to repeated
(mis)leading questions, children were questioned
by their parents, by therapists, members of the
prosecutors’ office leading up to the trial and by
the prosecution and defense attorneys at the trial.
When suggestions are implanted, not only can
they become incorporated into the report but are
used in highly productive ways to distort reality,
something that is highly likely to have occurred in
the day care cases discussed here.
We have referred to a substantial number of
suggestive interview techniques that have been
shown to have considerable impact on the accur-
acy of children’s reports. However, there are
several other related factors that ultimately led
Bruck and Ceci (1995) to conclude that the
conditions under which the children were inter-
viewed were “unsafe.” For example, young chil-
dren are sensitive to the status and power of their
interviewers. If a young child is being interviewed
by someone they perceive to be an authority that
child will be unlikely to challenge something that
has been said by that person. Bruck and Ceci
(1995) state that this power differential is one
of the most important factors in the susceptibility
to suggestion in children. Research has shown
this fact to be true (see Ceci & Bruck, 1993)
and the Michaels interviews show repeated refer-
ence to the status and trustworthiness of the
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interviewer, referring to their connection with law
enforcement:
I’m a policeman, if you were a bad girl, I would
punish you wouldn’t I? Police can punish bad
people
------------------------------------------------------------------
I’m going to introduce you to one of the men
who arrested Kelly and put her in jail.
(Michaels Interview, Bruck & Ceci, 1995, p. 286)
Bruck and Ceci (1995) also highlight the (mis)use
of anatomically detailed dolls during the Michaels
interviews. Dolls are often used by professionals
working with children to help cue recall, over-
come language problems and to provide a way to
communicate if they are shy or embarrassed.
Excessive preoccupation with the genitalia or
distress shown when they are undressed is
believed to show signs of abuse (Mason, 1991).
However, research has shown that dolls are
suggestive and can encourage sexualised play
even if the child has not been abused (e.g.,
Gardner, 1989; Terr, 1988). Ceci and Bruck
(1993) found that after a routine examination
with a paediatrician (some of which included a
genital examination), 3-year-old children were
inaccurate when reporting how and where they
were touched. Children who were not touched
demonstrated with dolls that they were touched,
whereas some of the children that were touched
falsely showed that penetration had occurred.
Children also demonstrated a number of other
bizarre behaviours. When asked what the doctor
did with a stethoscope, some children suggested it
was used on their genitals. When asked, “How he
might use a spoon?” a small number of children
inserted it into the genital or anal opening of
the doll.
The use of anatomical dolls seems significant
in the Michaels interviews. Bruck and Ceci (1995)
reported that anatomical dolls were shown to
children in 24 of the 39 interviews before sexual
abuse was reported by the child. Many suggestive
aspects of the interviews involved sexualised
questioning in the context of demonstrations
with the dolls. For example, children were asked
to speculate about how silverware could have
been used:
Interviewer: Why don’t you show me how you
think a little girl can be hurt by the fork?
And
Interviewer: Why don’t you show me what Kelly
did with the big wooden spoon.
Often, as shown above, the children resisted these
suggestions, but sometimes after much repetition,
the children responded by poking the silverware
into the genitalia or buttocks of the doll:
Interviewer: Can you think of a way somebody
might have used this to hurt little girls?
Child: (indicates the tummy)
Interviewer: Where else do you think a little girl
could have gotten hurt with a wooden spoon?
Child: The belly button.
Interviewer: Where else do you think a little girl
might get hit with a wooden spoon? How do you
think Kelly used this fork to hurt little girls?
Child: Belly button.
Interviewer: Where else?
(finally after many more persistent questions)
Child: Bottom.
(Michaels Interview, Bruck & Ceci, 1995, pp.
292–293)
Note here the similarities with the paediatrician
study when children were asked what the doctor
might do with a spoon. Professionals are now
cautious of the use of anatomical dolls with young
children as their use promotes sexualised behavi-
our and false reports in non-abused children.
Further factors such as interview length and
types of questioning have also been linked to
reliability issues in forensic interviewing of chil-
dren and false memory development (see Ceci &
Bruck, 1993, 1995; Poole & Lamb, 1998). Inter-
view length concerns not only the measure of
temporal length of the interview but also the
number of utterances per interview. Interview
length becomes a concern if young children show
signs of fatigue or wandering attention (e.g.,
Home Office, 2002). Published guidelines for
child forensic interviews also emphasise the
importance of allowing children to talk at length
and describe in their own words, the experiences
in question (Home Office, 2002; Poole & Lamb,
1998). Often, however, the interviewer can be
seen to do considerably more talking than the
child. In fact, the ratio of interviewer words to
child words has been used as a rough indicator of
suggestive and unskilful interviewing (Underwa-
ger & Wakefield, 1990). In a quantitative analysis
of interview length and ratio of utterances,
Schreiber et al. (2006) found that the McMartin
interviews lasted approximately 1 hour and 14
minutes, whereas the Michaels interviews lasted
approximately 23 minutes. In both cases there
were significantly more interviewer compared to
child words (ratio = 4.60 and 4.67, respectively).
Guidelines for interviewing children typically rec‐
ommend that the interviewer utilise open-ended
(“Tell me what happened”) or free narrative
questions where possible (American Professional
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Society on the Abuse of Children, 2002; Home
Office, 2002; Poole & Lamb, 1998). They are
more likely to lead to accurate accounts of an
event and reduce opportunity for suggestion.
However, young children are not always capable
of providing detailed narratives so guidelines also
indicate that open-ended questions can be fol-
lowed up with yes/no questions (“Did it happen
more than once?”), choice questions (“Was it
night time or day time?”) or focused/specific
questions (“Where did it happen?”). However,
such questions should be used sparingly and
should be of a non-suggestive nature. Unfortu-
nately, in child forensic interviews such questions
are often overused and used in a suggestive
manner. Schreiber et al. (2006) reported that the
majority of questions in the McMartin and
Michaels interviews were of the yes/no form
followed by focused/specific, with only around
10% of the questions being free recall/open
narrative.
We have presented a number of features that,
when present in interviews or interactions with
young children, may greatly compromise the
accuracy of their reports. Many of these features,
as well as others, were highlighted after the
widely publicised day care cases and the need
for a systematic change was called for when it
came to the investigative interviewing of children.
This systematic change came in the form of
interviewing protocols and the procedures that
should be used when interviewing children. We
now take a closer look at the development of
these protocols.
Expert professional groups have offered recom-
mendations regarding the most effective ways of
conducting forensic or investigative interviews
with children (e.g., American Professional Society
on the Abuse of Children, 1990, 1997; Home
Office, 1992, 2002; Jones, 2003; Lamb, 1994;
Orbach, Hershkowitz, Lamb, Sternberg, Esplin,
& Horowitz, 2000; Poole & Lamb, 1998). Such
recommendations all state that the interview
should be conducted as soon as possible after the
alleged event by interviewers who introduce as
little information as possible while encouraging as
much information as possible from the child using
open-ended questions to elicit narratives of the
event. Before substantive details of the event are
discussed, the interviewer should explain their
role, the purpose of the interview and set “ground
rules” (describe only events that “really hap-
pened,” use “don’t know,” correct the interviewer
if they are wrong and ask for clarification if they do
not understand a question). Interviewers are urged
to use open-ended questions as the norm, only use
recognition prompts or yes/no and forced choice
questions later in the interview, and only when
needed to elicit undisclosed forensically relevant
information (Lamb et al., 2007). Research has
shown that open-ended questions are much more
likely to elicit accurate information than that
elicited using more focused recognition responses
(Lamb & Fauchier, 2001; Orbach & Lamb, 1999,
2001). This is likely because open-ended questions
force the child to recall information from memory,
whereas more focused prompts, provided by the
interviewer, often only require the child to recog-
nise information. Interviewers are advised not to
use yes/no or forced choice questions because we
have seen how suggestive they can be.
However, despite this research and the expert-
endorsed recommendations, such interviewer
techniques were seldom followed. Lamb et al.
(2007) reported that descriptive studies of for-
ensic interviews from the USA, UK, Canada,
Sweden, Finland and Israel consistently showed
little use of open-ended prompts, and that inter-
viewers, even if they had been trained in proper
procedures, frequently deviated from these rec-
ommendations, usually being unaware they had
done so.
Because forensic interviewers often have diffi-
culty adhering to recommended interview prac-
tices in the field, Michael Lamb and colleagues
at the NICHD developed a structured interview
protocol designed to translate professional rec-
ommendations into operational guidelines (Lamb
et al., 2007; Orbach et al., 2000). The structured
NICHD Protocol provides explicit instructions to
guide interviewers through all phases of the
investigative interview, from the initial introduct-
ory phase, the rapport-building phase that accus-
toms children to the open-ended interview style
while building a relationship with the interviewer,
to the substantive phase which identifies a series
of open-ended prompts to identify the target, and
finally to the directive questioning phase to cover
crucial details that are still missing (see Table 1 for
a breakdown of these phases).
The findings obtained in independent field
studies in four different countries (e.g., Cyr,
Lamb, Pelletier, Leduc, & Perron, 2006; Lamb,
Orbach, Warren, Esplin, & Hershkowitz, 2006;
Orbach et al., 2000) demonstrate the effectiveness
of the NICHD Protocol. When forensic investi-
gators employ the structured NICHD Protocol,
they enhance the accuracy and quality of
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information elicited from alleged victims of all
ages. Research has shown that when using the
protocol at least three times more open-ended
questions are used and there is an approximate
50% drop in the number of option based and
suggestive prompts in comparison to similar inter-
views not using the protocol. The protocol is also
effective with young children with about half of
the informative and forensically relevant details
and more than 80% of the initial disclosures of
sexual abuse being provided by preschoolers in
response to free recall prompts. These findings
show that interviewers should only introduce
information if essential information is still missing
after free recall and directive prompts have been
exhausted because these alternatives are more
likely to elicit inaccurate information and their
introduction may contaminate any additional
information provided.
The NICHD Protocol is informed by current
research into child forensic interviewing and
remains a “work-in-progress” (Hershkowitz,
Lamb, & Katz, 2014; Pipe, Orbach, Lamb, Abbott,
& Stewart, 2013; for recent, comprehensive review,
see Lamb, Malloy, Hershkowitz, & La Rooy, in
press). Nevertheless, the structure of the protocol
provides trained interviewers with a more univer-
sal and useable set of guidelines that can be easily
adhered to. The end result is a protocol that can
elicit accounts that are more likely to be accurate
and less likely to be challenged in court. If experi-
enced interviewers can follow guidelines like the
structured protocol and continue to review their
interviews with other experienced interviewers
then even children as young as 4 years of age can
provide accurate and forensically usable informa-
tion about their experiences when interviewed
(Lamb et al., 2007).
HISTORIC SEXUAL ABUSE
So far we have focused on factors that can
influence both the accuracy and fallibility of
TABLE 1
Phases of the NICHD Protocol adapted from Lamb et al. (2007)
Phase I: Introduction The interviewer introduces him/herself, clarifies the child’s task (the need to describe events in
detail and to tell the truth), and explains the ground rules and expectations (i.e., that the child can
and should say “I don’t remember”, “I don’t know”, “I don’t understand”, or correct the interviewer
when appropriate). Examples are provided to ascertain whether the child understands these rules.
‘And if I say things that are wrong, you should tell me. Okay?’
‘So if I said that you are a 2-year-old girl [when interviewing a 5-year-old boy, etc.], what would
you say?’
Phase II: Rapport building The interviewer aims to create a relaxed, supportive environment for children and to establish
rapport between children and interviewer. The interviewer asks a series of questions to get to know
the child better.
‘Tell me about things you like to do.’
Phase III: Training in
episodic memory
Children are prompted to describe a recently experienced neutral event in detail. This “training” is
designed to familiarise children with the open-ended investigative strategies and techniques used in
the substantive phase while demonstrating the specific level of detail expected of them
‘A few [days/weeks] ago was [holiday/birthday party/the first day of school/other event]. Tell me
everything that happened on [your birthday, Easter, etc.].’
And then what happened?
‘Earlier you mentioned [activity mentioned by the child]. Tell me everything about that.’
Phase IV: Substantive
interview
This stage consists of a number of sub stages that include the transition to the substantive issues:
‘Now that I know you a little better, I want to talk about why [you are here] today.’
Followed by open-ended questions related to the allegations
‘Tell me everything about that.’
‘Then what happened?’ or ‘Tell me more about that.’
Once the child has provided a narration of the allegation using open-ended prompts the interviewer
can move on to elicit information that has not been mentioned by the child. For example:
‘When you told me about the time in the basement, you mentioned that he took off his trousers.
Did something happen to your clothes?’ [Wait for an answer.] [After the child responds, say:]
‘Tell me all about that.’
‘I see [I heard] that you have [marks/bruises] on your [––––––––––]. Tell me everything about
that.’
The interview closes after the child has been asked if they have any questions. The interviewer
finishes by asking a neutral topic question such as where they are going after they leave today.
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children’s memory for recent events. However,
what we know about memory and the inchoate
beliefs about memory can be damaging, espe-
cially in cases of “historic” sexual abuse (HSA).
We refer here to cases of HSA in which, typically,
an adult recalls abuse that took place years and
even decades earlier, usually when they were a
child or a young teenager. As with many cases of
sexual abuse, in HSA cases memory is often the
only evidence. Other evidence such as social
service records, medical records, reports from
teachers and other professionals is often lacking,
incomplete or unreliable.
The evidence in these cases consists of a
witness statement given by the complainant to
the police. An initial free recall account is
followed up by a series of detailed questions
about specific details of the event, for example,
what were they thinking and feeling, what clothes
were they wearing, what clothes others (e.g., the
accused, other witnesses) were wearing, what the
weather was like, what day of the week it was,
what time of day it was, what the furniture in the
room was like, position of body parts, conversa-
tions, and so on. As the witness is repeatedly
asked to recall these details, the police officer
strategically summarises what is being said at
convenient points in the developing narrative.
The outcome of this interview process is an
elaborate, fluent and detailed account of what
the complainant believes to be an accurate nar-
rative of their memory for an event (or set of
events) that transpired years earlier. Often the
resulting witness statement contains considerable
implausible details, such as what clothes the
witness was wearing when they went to bed 35
years earlier, aged 5 years old—details that adults
simply cannot remember (Wells, Morrison, &
Conway, 2014).
By way of an example, Conway (2013) refers
to a legal case in which he acted as an expert
memory witness. The complainant made a witness
statement at the age of 20 regarding her repeated
abuse by her father between the ages of 3–13
years. The statement contained a series of mem-
ories of acts of sexual abuse with the detailed and
vivid memory of a rape by multiple assailants in
her father’s hardware store. The details were
convincing enough to the jury to elicit a guilty
verdict, leading the father to receive a 14-year
prison sentence. Conway acted as an expert
witness when the case went to the Appeals Court.
In his report he highlighted a number of concerns,
one of which was the fluent narrative that
contained rich detail provided by the complainant
about events allegedly occurring before the age of
8 years. Conway refers to the earliest memory
provided by the compliant:
I remember standing in the garden looking at the
back of the house—it was July just before my
third birthday. The garden was full of rubbish
and weeds and the back of the house was shabby
and in disrepair with cracked paint peeling off
the windows, he [her father] never kept anything
in good shape.
A 2- to 3-year-old would not be able to have such
a rich memory for a relatively ordinary event.
The use of words such as “shabby” and “dis-
repair” are adult concepts, and it is highly
unlikely to have any memory for an event before
her third birthday. The complainant also recalled
a time marker “July”, but children typically have
a poor ability to record such details (Thompson,
Skowronski, Larsen, & Betz, 1996). The typical
defense against this argument is that the remem-
berer has the image in their mind from the time
of the event and is now describing it in their own
“adult” terms. However, this argument has its
limitations. Remembering what one cannot un-
derstand at the time and remembering stories
where comprehension is low, is subject to distor-
tion, condensation and error (Bartlett, 1932).
Other accounts from expert witnesses provide
equally unusual detail. Howe (2013b) observes a
vivid memory from a witness statement that
reports an event from when the complainant was
3 years old:
I was upstairs and I was playing in the spare
room, and I was a bit upset. I was wearing my
favorite pink dress and I remember him coming
up to me … and he just picks me up and he just
sat me on his lap and gave me a really big
squeeze. He was wearing jeans and a t-shirt and
would just sit there with his legs straight down in
front of him. When he picked me up he would sit
me facing the same way, he just pulled me really
close in to him … he had his arms around my
waist. I remember feeling uncomfortable.
It is important to note here that neither Howe
(2013b) nor Conway (2013) claim that adults who
have experienced trauma in childhood cannot
remember these events, because they do, particu-
larly if these events are still viewed by the person
as salient or life-changing experiences. Indeed,
adults who recall documented HSA experienced
some 12–21 years earlier were able to accurately
recollect core features of these experiences.
However, these narratives are typically sparse
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on peripheral information and contain recon-
structive errors (Alexander et al., 2005).
The expert memory witnesses’ role here is to
inform the jury of the scientific facts about how
memory works. In particular, that such reports of
memory do not conform to what we know about
memory. Memories with fluent narratives would
be considered as exceptional and unusual. Such
detail would be rarely seen in adult recall of
either positive or negative experiences from
childhood (Wells et al., 2014). Instead, childhood
memories are fragmentary, contain amnesic gaps,
information is often out of order, contain guesses,
unconscious inferences and often contain incor-
rect details. Rarely is the incorrect nature of these
details known to the rememberer. This is because
more often than not, the brain (e.g., via reconsol-
idation processes—see Howe, 2013a) automatic-
ally adds in plausible details, outside of conscious
awareness (Wells et al., 2014). This process of
“adding in” of many other types of details is
simply part of the complex memory construction
process. Nevertheless there is a powerful miscon-
ception in society generally that the more details
one can recall and the more specific they are, the
more likely it is for that memory to be accurate.
Indeed, a polished, fluent and detailed account
that typically results from a police interview is
considered thorough evidence for the prosecu-
tion. Research contradicts this, however, and in
fact the greater the detail the greater the likeli-
hood of error (Luminet & Curci, 2009).
Moreover, we know that early memories are
more fragile than memories formed in later
childhood and adulthood (e.g., Howe, 2011), and
that peripheral, episodic details deteriorate more
rapidly than core components. Thus, it is often
the case that as an adult, we are left with quite
vague and contextually poor recollections of the
past (Strange & Hayne, 2013). Indeed, when we
consider the development of our memory system
and the reconstruction process itself, we can see
the obvious difficulties we face when remember-
ing events from our childhood. Memories formed
before 4 or 5 years of age are poorly remem-
bered, often fragmentary and not well preserved
for future use (Howe, 2011; Howe, Courage, &
Rooksby, 2009). The more mature autobiograph-
ical memory system does not develop until after
the age of 5–7 years (Howe, 2011, 2013a), but
stable adult-like autobiographical memories are
rarely seen before the age of 8–10 years, with
recall from this period only possible if the event is
distinctive and memorable. Thus, unlike memory
in childhood for childhood events (which can
often be accurate at that time—see the previous
section in this review), adults’ memory for child-
hood events can be quite fragmentary and often
decontextualised, depending on the age at which
the event(s) took place.
What adults can remember from childhood is
also reliant on the developments that occur in
the semantic or conceptual components of mem-
ory (Howe, 2011). Young child’s knowledge base
is not as well developed as that of older children
and adults. Therefore when we recall an event
from childhood, we expect that the language and
concepts associated with the memory correspond
to that person’s knowledge base at the time the
memory was encoded. This becomes particularly
relevant when referring to memories of child-
hood sexual abuse. In our current adult world-
view, such an event would evoke the concept
and feeling of disgust, but such a concept is not
believed to have developed until approximately
5 years of age (Widen & Russell, 2013). Indeed,
the more complex concepts, including those
related to emotion (both positive and negative),
did not appear until later in childhood which was
reflected in the age of earliest memories asso-
ciated with that concept (Morrison & Conway,
2010).
There are several other factors to consider in
the developing stability and longevity of autobio-
graphical memories. With age, we become more
efficient at encoding, storing and retrieving
information that allows for the binding of
information into more coherent memories (New-
combe, Lloyd, & Balcomb, 2012). The emergence
of the cognitive-self around the age of 18–24
months allows events to be encoded, stored and
retrieved as personal, ones that have happened to
“me” (Howe & Courage, 1997). Finally, language
development allows us to share our past experi-
ences with others (e.g., Nelson & Fivush, 2004).
Conversations with parents can help restructure
and integrate personal experiences and enhance
retention of autobiographical events. However,
such conversations with others (e.g., peers, parents,
teachers) can also fundamentally change children’s
memories of events they have experienced.
Is there a special case for repressed
memories?
Research has shown us that all memories, regard-
less of whether they are for traumatic or
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mundane events that occur in childhood, adoles-
cence or adulthood are subject to decay, forget-
ting, interference and other memory mechanisms
that inevitably lead to constructive errors and
memory distortion. This becomes particularly
important when we consider the common misbe-
lief that memories for stressful and traumatic
events can be protected via some “special mem-
ory mechanism”. For example, allegations of
repressed and recovered memories of childhood
sexual abuse typically rely on repressive or disso-
ciative mechanisms that render painful material
inaccessible to consciousness (e.g., Briere &
Conte, 1993; Elliot & Briere, 1995). The belief is
that when these recollections do return, such
events are presumed unlikely to be forgotten in
“ordinary” ways, being protected from the ravages
of time and immune to the normal laws of memory.
However, others have stated that there is no
scientific evidence for the existence of these spe-
cial memory mechanisms and instead caution the
use of suggestive memory recovery techniques to
“unlock” repressed memories. Such caution is
based on a long history of research and scientific
data supporting the premise that humanmemory is
highly suggestible and malleable (see Ceci &
Loftus, 1994). Based on this evidence it is plausible
to believe that false memories may be inadvertently
created by risky therapeutic methods used in many
of the recovered memory claims (e.g., hypnosis,
guided imagery; Ceci & Loftus, 1994).
Such advocates of recovered memories claim
that adults who were abused as children, but have
complete amnesia of the abuse, will demonstrate
a variety of symptoms as a result of the abuse
(Bass & Davis, 2008; Dolan, 1991; Fredrickson,
1992). Typically authors that list such symptoms
as a “self-diagnosis checklist,” provide no infor-
mation regarding the scientific basis of the CSA
link to such symptoms. Bass and Davis (2008) list
74 characteristics associated with sexual abuse.
The list includes such attributes as relationship
difficulties, feeling dissatisfied with family rela-
tionships, sexual dysfunction, trouble expressing
feeling, and feeling different. Dolan (1991)
believes that when a client is exhibiting symptoms
indicative of abuse, it is the role of the therapist
to assist the client in recalling the repressed
abuse. Similar to Bass and Davis, the symptoms
Dolan describes include a wide range of problems.
These include dreams of being pursued, sleep
disturbances, eating disorders, substance abuse,
compulsive sexuality, sexual dysfunction, chronic
anxiety attacks, depression, difficulties with
relationships, distrust of others, guilt, impaired self-
esteem, self-destructive behaviours, and personal-
ity disorders. Unfortunately, these attributes, so
general as they are, could apply to any number of
behavioural and psychological problems, or indeed,
to some extent be applied to everyone.
Kihlstrom (1999) states that although it may be
true that abuse victims may display many of these
signs and symptoms, it does not follow that
everyone who displays these attributes is an
abuse victim. However, when patients come to
therapists, they are looking for answers to explain
any behavioural or psychological problems they
are experiencing. If the therapist concludes that
the patient is a victim of abuse, then with the
recovered-memory techniques that quickly ensue,
it is not surprising if reports of abuse arise. If a
criminal or civil claim is subsequently filed, the
problem the court faces is one of knowing
whether the report reflects a real experience or
an iatrogenic false memory. Because a memory is
not triggered it is reconstructed (Bartlett, 1932;
Kihlstrom & Barnhardt, 1993), whether the recol-
lection is reconstructed from a historically accur-
ate event is the key question that needs to be
addressed before a decision can be made about
an alleged perpetrator’s guilt or innocence.
We have seen that the absence of a mature
autobiographical memory system and its sub-
sequent emergence and development in later
childhood (after the age of 5–7 years) has been
well documented in both behavioural and neuro-
logical studies (Howe, 2011, 2013a). Before this
age we typically refer to a period of infantile and
childhood amnesia where memories are poorly
formed and typically forgotten. In fact, Howe
(2013a) states more stable, adult-like autobio-
graphical memories are rarely seen before the
age of 9–10 years, and even then, recalling events
from this period will only be possible if they are
particularly distinctive and memorable. However,
by some twist of logic, self-help guides (e.g., Bass
& Davis, 2008) and therapists take the very fact
that someone cannot remember their abuse to be
evidence that they were abused. Bass and Davis
make no reference to childhood amnesia or the
maturation of brain structures that allow for the
long-term recollection of autobiographical mem-
ories. Instead they make claims such as this:
If you don’t remember your abuse, you are not
alone. Many women don’t have memories, and
some never get any memories. This doesn’t mean
they weren’t abused. (p. 81)
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If you are unable to remember specific instances
… but still have a feeling that something abusive
happened to you, it probably did. (p. 21)
It is important to note here that prominent critics
of memory-recovery work such as Loftus, Freyd,
and Lindsay do not assert that all recovered
memory reports are false. Indeed there are
many cases where memories of CSA emerge after
long periods of forgetting. Instead, such critics
claim that there is no scientific evidence for a
special repression mechanism and that memory-
recovery work can lead to iatrogenic false mem-
ories. It is not implied that all accounts of
recovered CSA are false, or that all memory-
recovery techniques will always inevitably lead to
the formation of false memories (their research
alone shows this is not the case), but that the
creation of false memories do occur, and the false
beliefs of these events can be held confidently
(Lindsay & Read, 1994; Loftus, 1993).
Today we have a clearer understanding of the
uncertainty of recovered memory techniques and
their use to “unlock” recovered memories of
abuse. Official statements by the American Psy-
chological Association, Board of Trustees (1993)
have been made regarding uncorroborated recov-
ered memories of CSA. They clarify the need to
be aware of the issues of false accusations while
not discrediting the reports of patients who have
indeed been traumatised by actual previous
abuse. Basic clinical and ethical principles should
guide the psychiatrist’s work in this difficult area.
Such statements emphasise that caremust be taken
to avoid prejudging the cause of the patient’s
difficulties, or the veracity of the patient’s reports.
A strong prior belief by the psychiatrist that sexual
abuse, or other factors, are or are not the cause of
the patient’s problems is likely to interfere with
appropriate assessment and treatment. Clinicians
should not exert pressure on patients to believe in
events that may not have occurred. Clinicians need
specialised training to treat patients who report the
emergence of memories during specialised inter-
view techniques (e.g., hypnosis, guided imagery).
As Rogers (1992, 1994) noted, valid claims
may arise in therapy, but typically in these cases
the therapist did not use intrusive and suggestive
techniques and the patient will not have been
placed into influential group treatment until the
abuse had been fully documented. Thus, medical
records must be carefully examined in any court
case. The overwhelming issue is that there is no
litmus test to distinguish between true and false
memories (see Bernstein & Loftus, 2009;
Schacter, Chamberlain, Gaesser, & Gerlach,
2012). Therefore, when a memory is uncovered
in therapy, it is the role of the therapist to verify
empirically, any uncovered event. Because of the
lack of consensus in the scientific community for
the theory of repression and the inability to
determine truthfulness of a specific repressed
memory allegation without corroborative evid-
ence, repressed memory claims present special
equitable and evidentiary problems for the courts
(Amicus curiae: Minnesota Supreme Court, Doe
76C v. Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis
and Diocese of Winona, 2011), something we turn
to next.
There was a surge in cases involving claims of
recovered memories when courts and legislatures
in many states created legal mechanisms for both
criminal and civil actions based on recovered
memories (Loftus & Rosenwald, 1995). In cases
involving claims of recovered memories, one
party aims to prove the existence of repressed
memories, while the other party provides a
counterclaim, denying the abuse occurred and
argues that memories recovered in therapy
should be inadmissible in court. Here the ques-
tion has been, which party has the sustainable
claim to scientific knowledge (Underwager &
Wakefield, 1998). Taub (1999) provides a full
review of the False Memory Syndrome Founda-
tion (FMSF) Legal Survey, but here we highlight
some of the prominent historical cases based on
claims of recovered memory.
Paul Ingram
In 1989, defendant, Paul Ingram (State of Wash-
ington v. Ingram) received a 20-year prison
sentence after he pled guilty to the sexual and
ritual abuse of his two daughters. The sisters
asserted that years earlier they had been repeat-
edly raped and that at least 25 human babies,
some born to them, had been sacrificed in rituals
in the Ingram’s back yard. Police failed to locate
the burial grounds for the alleged ritual sacrifices.
Furthermore, medical examination of the daugh-
ters failed to yield any evidence of sexual activity
or of childbearing. Yet Paul Ingram, a deputy
sheriff, and a member of a Christian church,
believed that his children would not lie. Although
Ingram insisted he could not remember ever
doing anything he was accused of, he worked
with the detectives, pastor, and therapist to
visualise the attacks and eventually reported
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having flashbacks and images of abusing his two
daughters. Dr. Ofshe, a social psychologist, inter-
viewed Mr. Ingram at length and was able to
show how he had been persuaded to produce a
false confession through the use of long inter-
rogations using visualisation exercises and sug-
gestion, eventually coming to believe in and
accept the things he could not remember doing.
However, Ofshe’s report was not made available
to Ingram to use in the trial and, after pleading
guilty, Ingram was charged with six counts of rape
in the third degree. Ingram tried without success
to withdraw his guilty plea and remained in
prison until released in 2003 after serving his
sentence.
According to the FMSF Legal Survey, civil
lawsuits represent 86% of all repressed memory
cases in the US. Of the civil suits that have been
resolved, approximately 13% have gone to trial.
Between 1995 and 1998 only 8% of civil cases
have been resolved at trial (10 in favour of
plaintiffs and 4 in favour of defendants). During
that same period, 70% of the repressed memory
lawsuits were either dropped by the complainant
or dismissed by the courts due to the inadmissib-
ility of repressed memory testimony. Two such
cases highlighted in the legal survey are presented
below.
Joan Borawick
In 1992, Borawick (Borawick v. Shay), a 38-year-
old Connecticut woman sued relatives who, she
claimed, had sexually abused her when she was a
child. Claims included rituals where she was
drugged at the age of 3, then sexually abused
and forced to take part in ritual acts involving
drinking the blood of a dead pig. The appellant
initially claimed that the memories returned to
her spontaneously, but other court records
showed that the alleged abuse was reported
during a hypnotic session with her unlicensed
therapist. In 1996, the case was dismissed by the
US Second Circuit Court on the grounds of
suggestible hypnosis techniques used to recover
the memory, the far-fetched uncorroborated alle-
gations, and the lack of qualifications and accur-
ate record keeping of the therapist. Taub (1999)
states that following this case the court proposed
that certain factors be considered at a pretrial
evidentiary hearing before choosing to admit
posthypnotic testimony and that it is the respons-
ibility of the party seeking to admit the testimony
to persuade the court that the evidence is
admissible. These factors include: to be aware of
the aim or subject of the hypnotic session, to be
aware of any possible suggestions from the hyp-
notist, seek a record of the hypnosis session if
available, and show corroborating evidence.
Cherese Franklin
In 1992, Franklin began treatments with a psy-
chologist, Dr. Laurie Hoover after experiencing
panic attacks. Using a variety of recovered mem-
ory techniques including guided imagery, writing
with the nondominant hand, trance-work, relaxa-
tion, communicating with metaphorical “inner
children,” and journal writing Franklin began to
“recall” previously repressed memories of abuse.
At first Franklin believed the abuser had been
her father but later became convinced that Ste-
venson, a cousin 7 years her senior, committed
the abuse. She filed this action against him
(Franklin v. Stevenson). Despite Stevenson ori-
ginally requesting that the trial court exclude any
evidence and testimony from either the expert
witnesses or Franklin herself, the judge denied
this motion, and the jury returned a verdict
against Stevenson. In 1999, a Utah District Court
judge reversed a jury verdict in favour of the
plaintiff and dismissed the claim, drawing a
parallel between hypnotic suggestion and com-
municating with an “inner child.” This, along with
the other techniques used, was seen to be like
hypnosis, inherently unreliable for recovering
memories. Indeed, on cross-examination in this
case, Stevenson elicited concessions from Frank-
lin’s expert witness, Dr. Bessel van der Kolk,
regarding the lack of scientific support for the
memory techniques used with Franklin. Dr. van
der Kolk testified as follows:
Q. Is there any scientific literature, any studies
that you are aware of that have been done that
show that asking a question with one hand and
answering the question with the non-dominant
hand is a mechanism by which you can recover
an accurate memory of the past? Are there
studies?
A. It’s interesting that you ask the question,
actually, because this great Frenchman who
knew more about trauma than anybody else,
Pierre Jenet … in 1889 in his book … actually
wrote about that very phenomenon.
Q. Did his study deal with the issue of validating
the accuracy of the recovered memory, Doctor?
A. No, he didn’t.
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Q. Thank you. And are you aware of a single
study as of 1996 that has validated this as a
reliable technique for recovering memory,
Doctor?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. Thank you.
Q. Do you believe that there is any scientific
evidence to suggest that I could ask myself [a
question] and I could answer that question with
my nondominant hand and expect that I’m really
getting the truth?
A. Is there any scientific evidence? I’m not
aware of any studies specifically done on non-
dominant handwriting to support or disprove
that. It is a common clinical technique.
(Taken from: http://law.justia.com/cases/utah/
supreme-court/1999/franklin.html)
Unfortunately, these case examples show that
under certain circumstances memories for child-
hood experiences can be grotesquely distorted.
The ability to create false memories for childhood
experiences has been supported by extensive
laboratory based research. We can distort original
memories by exposing people to misleading
information (for a review, see Loftus, 2005). For
example Wade, Garry, Read, and Lindsay (2002)
used doctored images depicting false events from
an adult’s childhood. Through guided imagery
exercises (not unlike those used in recovered
memory therapy), participants were asked to
think about the photograph depicting them on a
hot air balloon ride (which they had never taken).
They found that 50% of participants created
complete or partial false memories for this event.
Although doctored images are very explicit
forms of misleading information, misinformation
can also be very subtle, demonstrating that
although misleading information can be pre-
sented unintentionally, it can still have devastat-
ing effects on what we remember about a past
event. Such studies have been criticised for
implanting memories for mundane events that
do not replicate the emotionally traumatic events
of child abuse. Although ethically we could not
implant false memories of child sexual abuse,
memory distortions have been demonstrated for
more negative and traumatic experiences from
childhood. For example, Porter, Yuille, and Leh-
man (1999) interviewed participants about highly
emotional and stressful events from their child-
hood (serious animal attack, a serious indoor or
outdoor accident), some of which were true and
some false. Using guided imagery and repeated
retrieval attempts, 26% of participants reported a
complete false memory and another 30% recalled
aspects of the false experience. Other studies
used similar method to elicit false memories of
nearly drowning as a child and being rescued by a
lifeguard (Heaps & Nash, 2001), or having to go
to hospital at the age of 4 after being diagnosed
with low blood sugar levels (Ost, Foster, Costall,
& Bull, 2005). Often initial interviews elicit little
detail, but with repeated questioning across suc-
cessive weeks, participants are able to provide a
detailed recollection, including thoughts at the
time into the narration:
I was living in [place name] at the time. It must
have been on a Sunday because my dad was
there. He was always around on a Sunday … I
don’t remember much about the hospital except
I know it was a massive, huge place. I was 5 years
old at the time and I was like ‘oh my God I don’t
really want to go into this place, you know it’s
awful’ … but I had no choice. They did a blood
test on me and found out that I had a low blood
sugar. (Ost et al., 2005, p. 710)
Taken together these studies show the power of
this strong form of suggestion. It has led many
participants to believe or even remember in detail
events that did not happen. Akin to the false
iatrogenic memories recovered in therapy, these
findings from laboratory-based studies show that
false memories are often a fusion of imagined,
real, and suggested information. However, as we
have cautioned earlier, there is no reliable test to
distinguish between a more or less accurate
memorial reconstruction versus one which con-
tains numerous distortions versus one that is a
complete fabrication. The major concern for the
more suggestive memory-recovery techniques is
the ease with which memories can be distorted.
Repressed memories or implanted false
memories for childhood experiences?
We have seen that memories for entire events
that did not happen can be created. Although we
should not create false sexual abuse memories in
controlled laboratory conditions, there is an
abundance of evidence demonstrating the ease
with which false memories can be implanted for
both mundane and negative events. In the court-
room, the problem is that there is no way to know
the difference between the retrieval of a real
memory and the convincing false belief in a
created memory (Spiegel & Scheflin, 1994). It is
likely that many cases of recovered memories can
be both accurate and illusory (Lindsay, 1999). We
have seen that the many techniques used over the
years to aid memory recovery risk the creation of
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false memories for events that never happened.
In many cases, without independent corrobora-
tion, it can be difficult to trust memory. It is also
likely that different approaches to recovered
memory work vary in their likely risk to produce
iatrogenic false memories. Yet science has not
been able to give us a definitive answer to which
approaches pose substantial risk and those that
do not (Lindsay, 1999). What research does exist
encourages the use of a “case-specific focus”
(Alison, Kebbell, & Lewis, 2006, p. 416) regard-
ing each circumstance that leads to the recovery
of a memory for child abuse.
Although it is impossible to postdict the accur-
acy of recovered memory claims, Lindsay (1999)
does consider some important factors to help
assess the plausibility of these claims. These
include: (1) how the recovered memory experi-
ence came about (with greater confidence in a
memory that was not recovered using suggestive
memory work), (2) the likelihood the event could
be forgotten (happened early in life, happened a
small number of times, common form of abuse),
and (3) at least some evidence in support of the
claim. Recovered memories that appear relatively
implausible should be treated with caution. A
more implausible claim would include reports of
abuse that is bizarre and extreme (e.g., satanic
ritual abuse), said to have happened numerous
times over the period of many years, said to have
happened during infancy, and to have emerged
via extensive memory-recovery work, and with no
supporting evidence. In cases where recovered
memories do appear in court, an expert memory
witness should be called upon. Although no
memory expert will be able to discern the truth
or falsity of an allegation, they will be able to
inform the courts regarding the effects of any
suggestive techniques used to recover the mem-
ory, how memory may have been influenced, and
the need for caution when considering the cred-
ibility of that memory. Although each case should
be evaluated on its own merits, implausible claims
such as those listed above where the abuse is only
recalled after extensive intrusive memory techni-
ques, should be treated with scepticism.
Despite this leap forward in the scientific
understanding of the foibles of cases involving
repressed/recovered memories, therapists’ experi-
ences of, and beliefs about, cases of recovered
memory, satanic abuse, dissociation, and false
memory still shows a considerable gap in under-
standing between the scientific and professional
fields. In an online survey published in 2013 (Ost,
Wright, Easton, Hope, & French, 2013), Char-
tered Clinical Psychologists and Hypnotherapists
agreed overwhelmingly with the existence of false
memories (over 80%). However, both groups
reported a belief in cases of satanic abuse and
repressed memories, with approximately one
third reporting that such cases could “usually” or
“always” be taken as essentially accurate.
Worse, this scientist-practitioner gap may be
more even larger than Ost et al.’s study suggests.
For example, when clinical psychologists, psycho-
analysts, neuro-linguistic programmers, internal
family systems therapists, hypnotherapists, and
other types of therapists were asked whether they
believed that traumatic memories are often
repressed, the majority of them agreed (range
60% to 90%; Patihis, Ho, Tingen, Lilienfeld, &
Loftus, 2014). When asked if repressed memories
could be accurately retrieved in therapy, again
the majority of these practitioners agreed (range
47% to 78%). What these recent surveys show is
that a number of therapists hold beliefs that
scientists would view as controversial, especially
in light of the last 20–30 years of research. One
hope is that this review will not just raise
awareness of this gap but reduce the size of this
gap. Perhaps by publicising what the science of
memory has taught us over the last few decades,
we can popularise what is known about the risks
and realities not just about recovered memories,
but about memory more generally.
EYEWITNESS (MIS)IDENTIFICATION
Next, we turn briefly to memory errors associated
with eyewitness (mis)identification using a prom-
inent case example to begin. On 18 September
2003, Calvin Willis was released from prison after
serving over 21 years for a crime he did not
commit. In 1982, Willis was tried and convicted
for the rape of a 10-year-old girl in Shreveport,
Louisiana. In June 1981, an intruder entered a
home where three girls—aged 10, 9 and 7—had
fallen asleep. Two of the girls had fallen asleep on
the couch, the third in bed. The intruder carried
the 9-year-old to the bed, where her 7-year-old
sister was sleeping. The 10-year-old victim awoke
and saw a man standing above her, naked except
for a cowboy hat. The attacker choked her and
banged her head against the wall. The victim was
able to escape and ran from the intruder, but was
caught in the front yard. She was kicked in the
stomach and lost consciousness. Her two younger
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sisters heard the noises but remained in the
bedroom. Their mother did not return to the
house until the morning.
What led to the conviction of Calvin Willis?
When the police began their investigation, the
interviews of the three girls produced inconsist-
encies in their statements. The 9-year-old girl
could not identify the perpetrator’s face but
described his shoes, which were shaped like
cowboy boots. At trial, the girl identified Willis
by his boots, although her testimony of what the
boots looked like differed from the boots Willis
was arrested in two days after the crime. She
testified that she did not see the attacker’s face.
The 7-year-old girl had been asleep but awoke
when she heard the victim’s cries and the attack-
er’s threats to kill her. She identified the voice as
that of Calvin Willis, whom she had spoken with
once. One police report said the 10-year-old
victim did not see her attacker’s face. Another
report—which wasn’t introduced at trial—said
she identified Calvin Willis, who lived in the
neighbourhood. The girl’s mother testified that
Willis had been in her house before, he was
known to wear a cowboy hat, she had seen him in
boots similar to those described by her daughter.
The police testimony also differed with regard
to the photographic evidence. An investigator
testified that she showed the victim a lineup that
included Willis’s photograph because the victim
had said that Calvin was the attacker. Her mother
provided the last name of Willis. The victim’s
mother testified that Willis’s name did not come
up before the lineup. Upon further questioning,
however, she testified that the victim had said
Calvin did it before they were taken to the police
station and that he had been wearing a cowboy
hat and cowboy boots. The victim testified that
she was told to pick the men in the photographic
lineup that did not have a full beard. She also
testified that she did not pick anyone from the
lineup and that Willis’s picture was not part of the
array. The victim never made an in-court identi-
fication of Willis but stated that Calvin was
standing about her when she awoke. Willis was
convicted by a jury and sentenced to life in
prison.
In 1998 his case was accepted by the Innocence
Project and a post-conviction DNA test of the
rape kit and a pair of boxers left at the scene of
the crime excluded Willis as the perpetrator
of the rape that occurred in 1981 and ultimately
led to his sentence of life without the possibility
of parole (see “Innocence Project—Calvin
Willis”, 2003).
Eyewitness testimony that directly implicates
an alleged perpetrator is compelling evidence in
any trial and a single witness’s identification can
often be enough to obtain a conviction. However,
eyewitness misidentification is the single greatest
cause of wrongful convictions. The Innocence
Project is a non-profit legal clinic founded in
1992 by Barry C. Scheck and Peter J. Neufeld in
association with the Benjamin N. Cardozo School
of Law at Yeshiva University. The project is a
national litigation and public policy organisation
dedicated to exonerating wrongfully convicted
people through DNA testing. An eyewitness
report published by the Innocence Project (Inno-
cence Project, 2010) stated that over 230 people,
serving an average of 12 years in prison have
been exonerated through post-conviction DNA
testing in the USA alone. Of those wrongfully
convicted over 75% involved eyewitness misiden-
tification (179 people). The report highlights a
number of worrying statistics. For example, of
those 179 individual cases, 38% were based on
multiple eyewitness misidentifications of the same
innocent suspect. Fifty-three percent involved
cross-racial misidentifications. In 50% of the
misidentification cases there was no further cor-
roborating evidence and the eyewitness testimony
was the central evidence used against the defend-
ant. Of most ill fate, in 36% of these cases the real
perpetrator was identified through the post-con-
viction DNA test, and in just fewer than 50% of
these cases, they had gone on to commit addi-
tional crimes of rape and murder.
However, eyewitness testimony is still among
the most prevalent and persuasive evidence used
in the courtrooms:
The U.S. legal system currently allows conviction
of criminal charges based solely on the testimony
of a single eyewitness. It is therefore of consid-
erable importance to ask whether the eyewitness
accuracy is sufficient to warrant a conclusion of
guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt” (Davis &
Loftus, 2012, p. 2).
Scholars in this field have long recognised the
weaknesses of eyewitness testimony. Much re-
search has examined the limits of human memory
and the conditions under which distortions can be
made. Based on this research we can inform the
legal system regarding some basic limits of per-
formance and we can aid conditions in which
maximum accuracy does not surpass that of
guessing. It is important to understand the limits
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of memory, not only the factors that affect
suggestion, but also factors that affect our per-
ceptual capacities. The end goal is to understand
the conditions that lead to the most accurate
eyewitness testimony. However, as Davis and
Loftus (2012) state, there is much evidence to
suggest that even under the best conditions,
eyewitness accuracy may still not be sufficient
enough to allow convictions based solely on the
testimony of one or more eyewitnesses.
So where does this leave the legal system?
Many scholars argue that the best option is to
allow an expert witness to testify to the factors
that can affect an eyewitness’s ability to perceive
and remember. However, a recent advancement
in the recognition of weaknesses in eyewitness
testimony comes from a decision in New Jersey.
This case involved a defendant named Larry
Henderson who was accused of participating in a
New Year’s Day shooting. Following a delay of
approximately two weeks, a surviving witness
identified Henderson from photos and Hender-
son was convicted. However, as it turned out, the
initial identification of Henderson occurred after
the investigating officers engaged in persuasive
behaviour. Worse, earlier in the day the witness
had consumed large amounts of wine, cham-
pagne, and crack cocaine, making the identifica-
tion even more suspect.
When Henderson appealed his conviction
(New Jersey Supreme Court, 2011) the decision
received national attention. In essence, like the
case discussed above, the ruling showed a soph-
isticated appreciation of problems with (eyewit-
ness) memory. This decision led to changes in
how evidence adduced through suggestive influ-
ences is treated in the courtroom. Specifically, if a
judge decides to admit such testimony at trial,
then the jurors must be provided with instructions
that will guide them on how to interpret that
eyewitness evidence (the specific New Jersey
instructions were drafted by the Committee on
Model Criminal Jury Charges can be found on
the Internet at: www.judiciary.state.nj.us/criminal/
ModelCrimJuryChargeCommHENDERSONRE
PORT.pdf). Inspired by the New Jersey decision,
in Pennsylvania Elizabeth Loftus and her colleagues
took these instructions a step further and drafted
jury instructions that considered the problems
with memory testimony much further (the full set
of Pennsylvania instructions can be found at: www.
dauphincounty.org/government/Court-Departments/
Officesand-Departments/Court-of-Common-Pleas/
Documents/Turgeon/Model-Eyewitness-Identifica
tion-Jury-Instructions.pdf).
These are still, however, isolated cases. The
legal system in general has yet to find a satisfact-
ory mechanism for educating jurors. Many of the
eyewitness instructions given by judges are still
ineffective: they contain ambiguous and confusing
language, they are given at the end of trial as part
of a long list of other legal instructions, and in
many cases, they reinforce jurors’ flawed assump-
tions about eyewitness accuracy (Sheehan, 2011).
Encouraging recent research has shown the bene-
fit of providing eyewitness instructions before the
eyewitness testifies, and providing model instruc-
tions, which attempt to convey scientific and legal
principles that are meaningful and comprehens-
ible to lay jurors (Sheehan, 2011).
As of the writing of this review, a draft of a
report on eyewitness identification has just been
published (National Academy of Science, 2014). In
this report, there are 11 recommendations concern-
ing best practices for the law enforcement com-
munity when it comes to understanding the science
of eyewitness identification. These range from
implementing double-blind lineup and photo array
procedures (Recommendation 2) to using scientific
framework expert testimony (Recommendation 8)
and clear and concise jury instructions (Recom-
mendation 9) when eyewitness identification plays
an important part in a trial. We continue to hope
that such best practice techniques infiltrate the
judicial system and become policy for future court
cases involving eyewitness testimonies.
THE ROLE OF MEMORY EVIDENCE IN
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Finally, there are an increasing number of cases
in which scientific research on memory has been
effectively integrated into the courtroom. Expert
testimony is being sought in more and more HSA
cases, testimony that has helped the triers of fact
interpret the memory evidence that has been
heard (e.g., Brainerd, 2013; Conway, 2013;
Howe, 2013a, 2013b). In a recent case heard in
the Royal Courts of Justice, Queen’s Bench
Division [(2013) EWHC 3560 (Comm); Case
No. 2011 Folio 1267] between Gestmin v. Credit
Suisse, Mr. Justice Leggatt dealt directly with
issues to do with human memory. Specifically, he
stated in his decision (section on “Evidence based
on recollection”) that:
MEMORY IN JUDICIAL PROCESSES 651
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [2
17
.15
5.1
94
.86
] a
t 0
8:0
5 1
4 A
pr
il 2
01
5 
15. An obvious difficulty which affects allegations
and oral evidence based on recollection of events
which occurred several years ago is the unreliab-
ility of human memory.
16. While everyone knows that memory is
fallible, I do not believe that the legal system
has sufficiently absorbed the lessons of a century
of psychological research into the nature of
memory and the unreliability of eyewitness testi-
mony. One of the most important lessons of such
research is that in everyday life we are not aware
of the extent to which our own and other
people’s memories are unreliable and believe
our memories to be more faithful than they are.
Two common (and related) errors are to sup-
pose: (1) that the stronger and more vivid is our
feeling or experience of recollection, the more
likely the recollection is to be accurate; and (2)
that the more confident another person is in their
recollection, the more likely their recollection is
to be accurate.
17. Underlying both these errors is a faulty model
of memory as a mental record which is fixed at the
time of experience of an event and then fades
(more or less slowly) over time. In fact, psycho-
logical research has demonstrated that memories
are fluid and malleable, being constantly rewrit-
ten whenever they are retrieved. This is true even
of so-called “flashbulb” memories, that is memor-
ies of experiencing or learning of a particularly
shocking or traumatic event. (The very descrip-
tion “flashbulb” memory is in fact misleading,
reflecting as it does the misconception that mem-
ory operates like a camera or other device that
makes a fixed record of an experience.) External
information can intrude into a witness’s memory,
as can his or her own thoughts and beliefs, and
both can cause dramatic changes in recollection.
Events can come to be recalled as memories
which did not happen at all or which happened
to someone else (referred to in the literature as a
failure of source memory).
18. Memory is especially unreliable when it comes
to recalling past beliefs. Our memories of past
beliefs are revised to make them more consistent
with our present beliefs. Studies have also shown
that memory is particularly vulnerable to inter-
ference and alteration when a person is presented
with new information or suggestions about an
event in circumstances where his or her memory
of it is already weak due to the passage of time.
19. The process of civil litigation itself subjects the
memories of witnesses to powerful biases. The
nature of litigation is such that witnesses often
have a stake in a particular version of events. This
is obvious where the witness is a party or has a tie
of loyalty (such as an employment relationship) to
a party to the proceedings. Other, more subtle
influences include allegiances created by the pro-
cess of preparing a witness statement and of
coming to court to give evidence for one side in
the dispute. A desire to assist, or at least not to
prejudice, the party who has called the witness or
that party’s lawyers, as well as a natural desire to
give a good impression in a public forum, can be
significant motivating forces.
20. Considerable interference with memory is also
introduced in civil litigation by the procedure of
preparing for trial. A witness is asked to make a
statement, often (as in the present case) when a
long time has already elapsed since the relevant
events. The statement is usually drafted for the
witness by a lawyer who is inevitably conscious of
the significance for the issues in the case of what
the witness does nor does not say. The statement is
made after the witness’s memory has been
“refreshed” by reading documents. The docu-
ments considered often include statements of
case and other argumentative material as well as
documents which the witness did not see at the
time or which came into existence after the events
which he or she is being asked to recall. The
statement may go through several iterations
before it is finalised. Then, usually months later,
the witness will be asked to re-read his or her
statement and review documents again before
giving evidence in court. The effect of this process
is to establish in themind of thewitness thematters
recorded in his or her own statement and other
writtenmaterial, whether they be true or false, and
to cause the witness’s memory of events to be
based increasingly on this material and later
interpretations of it rather than on the original
experience of the events.
21. It is not uncommon (and the present case was
no exception) for witnesses to be asked in cross-
examination if they understand the difference
between recollection and reconstruction or
whether their evidence is a genuine recollection
or a reconstruction of events. Such questions are
misguided in at least two ways. First, they erro-
neously presuppose that there is a clear distinction
between recollection and reconstruction, when all
remembering of distant events involves recon-
structive processes. Second, such questions disreg-
ard the fact that such processes are largely
unconscious and that the strength, vividness and
apparent authenticity of memories is not a reliable
measure of their truth.
22. In the light of these considerations, the best
approach for a judge to adopt in the trial of a
commercial case is, in my view, to place little if any
reliance at all on witnesses’ recollections of what
was said in meetings and conversations, and to
base factual findings on inferences drawn from the
documentary evidence and known or probable
facts. This does not mean that oral testimony
serves no useful purpose—though its utility is
often disproportionate to its length. But its value
lies largely, as I see it, in the opportunity which
cross-examination affords to subject the docu-
mentary record to critical scrutiny and to gauge
the personality, motivations and working practices
of a witness, rather than in testimony of what the
witness recalls of particular conversations and
events. Above all, it is important to avoid the
fallacy of supposing that, because a witness has
confidence in his or her recollection and is honest,
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evidence based on that recollection provides any
reliable guide to the truth.
This very important decision highlights not only
the importance of understanding the (un)reliabil-
ity of memory generally, but also the role it plays
in courtroom testimony. As well, this decision
indicates that research on memory has made
some real inroads into at least some courtroom
proceedings. However, there is still considerable
work left to do in order to get memory expert-
ise into the many courtrooms where such
evidence is needed in order that the triers of
fact can determine the proper weight to give
memory evidence when determining guilt or
innocence.
CONCLUSION
We have reviewed a number of areas in which the
judicial system relies heavily or solely on memory
evidence. This is by no means an exhaustive
review as there are many other cases where the
judiciary relies on people’s memories to educe
whether a crime has or has not occurred. What
we did review revealed that there are still gaps
between what the science of memory tells us
about the reliability of memory, what clinical
practitioners believe, and what triers of fact
need to know about memory in order to give
proper weight to memory evidence.
The good news is that there are some serious
inroads being made, ones that are reducing these
gaps, especially in the legal arena. The hallmark
cases that we have reviewed here from the 1980s
and the 1990s have stimulated considerable
research whose results have advanced not only
our understanding of memory generally, but also
of memory in a forensic context more specifically.
What these advances show is that understanding
the implications of the shortcomings of memory is
of mutual benefit to both scientific and forensic
communities. When we align the two we are able
to advance our understanding of the development
and capability of memory but also support practi-
tioners to develop new techniques and protocols
for examining memory in forensic fields. How-
ever, there are still considerable gaps in what we
have recently discovered in the scientific study of
memory and the beliefs still held about memory in
other more applied fields, including the legal com-
munity. Our hope is that the relationship between
the scientific community and other professions
continues to develop so that what becomes known
about memory, might become better disseminated
and influence policy changes, procedures, and
practices in important forensic contexts.
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